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COMMENT
INSULATING JUSTICE: HOW NEW YORK
CITY’S MULTIPLE-MATCHING FUNDS
CAN HELP RESTORE THE INTEGRITY
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
DEVIN K. BRUCE*
ABSTRACT
There is a growing concern that special interest groups are using cam-
paign contributions to judicial candidates to influence the outcomes of law-
suits. So how do we reduce the influence of money on judges while still
allowing judicial elections in Minnesota?
I argue that New York City’s public finance system, which gives multi-
ple-matching funds to individual small donors, is a possible solution. Be-
cause the system amplifies the importance of small donors and shifts
reliance away from contributions by special interest groups, the multiple-
matching of public funds provides an effective, practical, and constitutional
means for removing any real or perceived influence from campaign contri-
butions. Although the following Comment highlights many Minnesota-spe-
cific circumstances, the system would work in almost any state that wishes
to elect their judges and justices.
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with a unique case. A
judge who received massive political contributions from a West Virginia
coal company refused to recuse himself from a case involving that same
company, and in fact, cast the deciding vote in overturning a $50 million
* I would like to thank my wife and my family for their support and patience while I was
writing this Comment. I would also like to thank Professor David Schultz of Hamline University
School of Law for helping me develop my thoughts into a paper, and Professor Robert Kahn of
University of St. Thomas School of Law for helping me reorganize the paper into something the
University of St. Thomas Law Journal would agree to publish. And finally, a special thanks to the
Brennan Center for Justice, Justice at Risk, and the National Institute on Money in State Politics
for their work in compiling the data necessary for me to write this Comment.
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jury verdict awarded against the company on appeal.1 The Court concluded
in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. that, given the “serious risk of actual
bias [created] when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case
by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign,” Due Process
requires that the judge recuse himself.2 The rationale for the majority opin-
ion was that because actual bias was difficult to prove, the strong appear-
ance of bias was enough to trigger the need for recusal.3
What was really at stake in Caperton, and in judicial elections gener-
ally, was the public confidence in judges’ neutrality. Nearly a decade before
writing the opinion in Caperton, Justice Anthony Kennedy articulated that
concern, stating “the law commands allegiance only if it commands re-
spect[;] [i]t commands respect only if  the public thinks the judges are neu-
tral.”4 There is a way to better insulate judges from the influence of
campaign contributions and guarantee fairer, more legitimate judicial elec-
tions. New York City uses multiple matching of public funds in municipal
elections to achieve this purpose. This system could also work for judicial
elections.
Part I of the following Comment will briefly explore the problem of
disproportionate influence created by judicial elections generally, then high-
light some problems with Minnesota’s current system of electing judges.
Part II will propose using multiple-matching public funds, such as the sys-
tem currently being used in New York City, as a solution for insulating
judges from the actual or apparent influence of campaign contributors.
Some may argue that the problem illustrated above could be solved simply
by strengthening judicial ethics or eliminating judicial elections altogether.
However, because the legal community is the primary source of judicial
campaign contributions,5 requiring a judge to recuse himself or herself each
time a contributor comes before the court is unreasonable, and whether
1. The $3 million contribution to West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justice Brent
Benjamin accounted for sixty percent of the money spent on his candidacy and more than three
times the amount that Benjamin’s own campaign had spent. JAMES SAMPLE, ADAM SKAGGS,
JONATHAN BLITZER & LINDA CASEY, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009:
DECADE OF CHANGE 55–56, 60 (Charles Hall ed., 2010) (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
JAS-NPJE-Decade-ONLINE.pdf.
2. Caperton v. A.T. Massey, 556 U.S. at 884.
3. Id.
4. Peter Joy, Insulation Needed for Elected Judges, 22 NAT’L L.J., Jan. 10, 2000, at A19
(quoting Justice Anthony Kennedy, Interview by Bill Moyers with Justices Stephen Breyer and
Anthony Kennedy, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/justice/inter-
views/supremo.html).
5. Of the $261,290 given to Minnesota Supreme Court candidates in 2012, the largest single
industry was lawyers and lobbyists, providing $55,322. The top five contributors overall were all
law firms or lawyers and only gave to incumbent justices. Nat’l Inst. On Money in State Politics,
Minnesota 2012, Election Overview, FOLLOW THE MONEY, http://www.followthemoney.org/data
base/StateGlance/state_candidates.phtml?s=MN&y=2012&f=J (last visited Aug. 21, 2014).
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states should have their judges held accountable to the public is a policy
question that should be addressed through thorough public debate. This
Comment will then take up the pros and cons of the multiple-matching sys-
tem, including the hurdles to implementing the system in Minnesota, before
concluding that using the system in judicial elections provides a constitu-
tionally sound balance between the state interests in holding judges ac-
countable to the public while also insulating them from the potentially
corrupting influence of campaign contributions.
I. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS INHERENTLY UNDERMINE THE NOTION OF AN
IMPARTIAL, APOLITICAL JUDICIARY
Though there are many problems with judicial elections, this section
will discuss three of the largest. First, judicial elections leave judges vulner-
able to political influence because money is needed to run an effective cam-
paign. Second, the fact that judges receive campaign contributions from the
very people that appear before their court creates a perception of bias not
only among the public, but also among judges themselves. And third, that
simply strengthening judicial ethics fails to address the numerous loopholes
in the system and creates an imbalance between judicial candidates and
sitting judges up for reelection.
A. Judicial elections leave judges vulnerable to political influence
In designing the judicial system, the Framers intended for the least
powerful branch to be a nonpolitical entity from which impartial judges
would deliver impartial justice. Alexander Hamilton argued that judicial se-
lection was “too great a disposition to consult popularity,” and that “[t]he
complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a
limited Constitution.”6 Yet, because the states designed their own judicial
systems, many have left their state supreme court justices vulnerable to po-
litical forces by allowing their justices to be selected or retained through
some form of popular election process.7 In recent years, the ability of courts
to remain insulated from partisan political influences has been jeopardized
by the increasing influence of money in judicial elections, as well as attacks
on judges and judicial power, as in the Iowa example discussed below.
Thirty-nine states elect some, if not all, of their judges, and nearly
ninety percent of all state judges have participated in an election either to
6. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
7. Most states have a short-term appointment followed by a longer-term popular election
selection process for state supreme court justices. Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE
SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm? (last
visited Aug. 20, 2014).
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gain or retain a seat on the bench.8 In describing the current state of judicial
elections, former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who is now
leading an effort to change state judicial elections, characterized them as
“tawdry and embarrassing,” relegating judges to be nothing more than “pol-
iticians in robes.”9 The only four states that provide some type of judicial
public financing are North Carolina, Wisconsin, New Mexico, and West
Virginia,10 none of which utilize a multiple-match program.
The Iowa Supreme Court unanimously struck down a law prohibiting
same-sex marriage in 2009.11 When three of the justices went up for reten-
tion election the following year, money from groups opposed to same-sex
marriage poured in from across the country.12 Judicial candidates in Iowa
traditionally do not raise money or campaign, so as to avoid apparent or
actual bias.13 Instead, independent groups were formed to support or oppose
their retention. Nearly $1 million was raised to defeat the Iowa justices,
while only $423,767 was raised in support of retention, and the justices
were ousted for the first time since 1962.14 Though Iowa’s judicial cam-
paigns are atypical, the underlying problem of increased politicization
reaches all states where judges are elected. These elections, traditionally
low-dollar races, are becoming more expensive and it is increasingly diffi-
cult for judges to rely on individual donors to run effective campaigns.
Large-dollar races come with large donor special interests that seek to use
sizeable campaign contributions to influence policymaking. In fact, more
than twenty-seven percent of all spending in the 2011–12 judicial elections
was attributed to independent groups, with the top ten spenders accounting
for more than $19.6 million of the $56.4 million total spending.15
8. Adam Skaggs, Buying Justice: The Impact of Citizens United on Judicial Elections,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 1, 2 (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/de-
fault/files/legacy/publications/BCReportBuyingJustice.pdf?nocdn=1.
9. John Schwartz, Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/us/24judges.html?_.
10. Public Financing, JUSTICE AT STAKE, http://www.justiceatstake.org/issues/state_court_is
sues/public-financing/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
11. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
12. Five out-of-state groups spent $980,473 on independent expenditures to oust the justices
facing retention. Linda Casey, Independent Expenditure Campaigns in Iowa Topple Three High
Court Justices, FOLLOW THE MONEY (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/
ReportView.phtml?r=440.
13. See Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, THE DES MOINES REGISTER, Nov. 3,
2010, http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/Iowans-dismiss-
three-justicesaccessed.
14. Between 2000 and 2008, no money was spent on judicial elections in Iowa, including
independent spending. Kevin McNellis, Independent Spending in Iowa, 2006–2010, FOLLOW THE
MONEY (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=464.
15. ALICIA BANNON, ERIC VELASCO, LINDA CASEY & LIANNA REAGAN, THE NEW POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2011–2012: HOW NEW WAVES OF SPECIAL INTEREST SPENDING RAISED
THE STAKES FOR FAIR COURTS 2–4 (Laurie Kinney & Peter Hardin, 2013), available at http://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/New%20Politics%20of%20Judicial%20El
ections%202012.pdf.
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B. Campaign contributions to judges raise serious doubts about
whether judges can remain impartial
Some surveys suggest that there is already skepticism about whether
judges are truly being impartial when large donors come before the courts.
In a 2001 national poll by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, a highly regarded
public-opinion-polling organization, seventy-six percent of those surveyed
believed campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions.16 Statewide
polls have shown similar results. Nearly eighty-five percent of Wisconsin
residents and ninety percent of Minnesota residents believed campaign con-
tributions influenced judicial decision-making,17 while New York residents
responded in two separate polls with the same sentiment.18 The most troub-
ling poll comes from judges themselves. In a survey of about 2,400 state
judges, forty-six percent of respondents believed that judicial decisions
were influenced by campaign contributions, and fifty-six percent believed
judges should be prohibited from presiding over cases where one of the
parties has given money to their campaigns.19 The entire system of justice is
predicated on the belief that the system is impartial and fair. When people
no longer believe that state judiciaries can deliver impartial and neutral jus-
tice, then the courts have lost their legitimacy. Evidence suggests their be-
lief has merit.
Several studies focused on whether campaign contributions affected
judicial decision-making. The Texans for Public Justice, a non-profit re-
search organization, released a study of the petitions for review filed with
the Texas Supreme Court from 1994 to 1998.20 The study found that the
court was four times more likely to accept a petition filed by a party, attor-
ney, or firm that had contributed to one or more of the justices who were up
for election during that time than if the petition were filed by non-contribu-
tors.21 Moreover, the study found the probability that the petition would be
granted review increased with the amount of the contribution; those who
gave $100,000 were seven-and-a-half times more likely to have their peti-
tions granted than non-contributors, and those who gave $250,000 were ten
times more likely to have the petition granted than non-contributors.22
16. Aman L. McLeod, If at First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Review of Judicial Selection
Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 509 (2005) [hereinafter A Critical Review] (citing
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc., Justice at Stake – State Judges Frequency Question-
naire, 5 (2001)).
17. Skaggs, supra note 8, at 5. For actual survey used in Minnesota, see Decision Resources,
Ltd., Justice at Stake Study (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/
MinnesotaJusticeatStakesurvey_717C253F67D9B.pdf.
18. Skaggs, supra note 8, at 5.
19. Id. at 7.
20. McLeod, supra note 16, at 506.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Another study on the effects of campaign contributions on justices’
voting behavior found that in Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio, contributions
from pro-plaintiff lawyers and party affiliation were important predictors of
a pro-plaintiff vote.23 Separately, a closer analysis of the Texas Supreme
Court found a stronger correlation between contributions and judicial deci-
sions.24 Madhavi McCall, a political science professor at San Diego State
University, looked at a group of cases between 1994 and 1997 and found
that some of the more conservative justices were more likely to vote with
plaintiffs in cases concerning procedural issues if the plaintiffs or their law-
yers had made campaign contributions to those justices during the most
recent election.25
Finally, a study was conducted on the effects of campaign contribu-
tions made by firms representing clients in certain civil cases before the
Michigan Supreme Court.26 After controlling for variables such as party
affiliation and proficiency of the law firm, the results indicate that firms
contributing more than opposing counsel to a justice’s campaign had a
greater chance of winning that justice’s vote in cases regarding the acts of
state and local governments.27 For example, in cases involving government
regulation, when there was a $5,000 contribution advantage by firms sup-
porting the government’s position over their opponents, the probability of a
Democratic justice voting with the larger contributor increased seventeen
percent; for a Republican justice, the probability increased twenty-eight
percent.28 For cases where firms opposing the government’s position
donated more, the likelihood that a Democratic justice would find for the
government decreased six percent, while the likelihood that a Republican
justice would support the government’s regulation decreased fourteen per-
cent.29 The evidence suggests there is a correlation between money and
influence in judicial elections. A recent study focusing on corporate contri-
butions shows a stronger relationship between business contributions and
justices voting in the years 2010–12 compared to 1995–98.30
23. Id. at 507.
24. Id. at 507–08.
25. Id.
26. McLeod, supra note 16, at 508 (citing Aman L. McLeod, An Excess of Participation: A
Critical Examination of Judicial Elections and Their Consequences for American Democracy
43–76 (June 8, 2004) (unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the author)).
27. McLeod, supra note 16, at 505–10.
28. Id. at 508.
29. Id.
30. Joanna Shepherd, Justice at Risk: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and
Judicial Decisions, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POLICY 14 (2013), available at http://
www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20Risk%20(FINAL)%206_10_13.pdf.
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The sources of campaign contributions in general are overwhelmingly
from a small sector of the population and special interest groups,31 such as
the involvement of the legal community in judicial elections mentioned
above. When a small, homogenous group of donors makes up a majority of
campaign contributions, the public will perceive that results are bought and
paid for by those special interests. And the studies above seem to indicate
that there is at least some small truth to that perception. The judicial elec-
tion process promotes this type of symbiotic relationship between money
and influence because candidates need large amounts of money to run for
election, and to keep the contributions coming from the “donor class,” those
candidates need to produce favorable policy outcomes.
C. Judicial ethics do not adequately address the problem of
disproportionate influence
Current judicial codes of conduct do provide some protection against
disproportionate influence by judicial campaign contributors. Minnesota,
for example, prohibits judges and judicial candidates from personally solic-
iting donations when speaking to an audience of less than twenty people,32
and the candidates’ committees are prohibited from communicating the
names of the donors to the judicial candidate.33 Furthermore, candidates are
prohibited from accepting individual contributions of, in aggregate, $2,000
in an election year and $500 in a nonelection year.34 But these do not ade-
quately address disproportionate influence in judicial elections.
In the Minnesota system, a judicial candidate’s committee is prohib-
ited from communicating the names of donors with the candidate. However,
31. Although the article focused on congressional and presidential campaigns, the proposi-
tion extends to campaigns at all levels. See Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Fi-
nance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 73 (2004).
32. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT. R. 4.2(b)(3) (2014).
33. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT. R. 4.4(b)(3) (2014).
34. Judicial Campaigns and Elections: Minnesota, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y http://www.judici
alselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign_financing.cfm?state=MN
(last visited July 29, 2013). There is also some debate on the legality of Minnesota’s aggregate
contribution limits after McCutcheon v. FEC, in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down ag-
gregate contribution limits for federal elections. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct.
1434 (2014). Even if the decision applies to state campaign finance laws, Minnesota’s aggregate
contribution limit is much different in that it applies to the candidates rather than the contributors.
MINN. STAT. § 10A.27(11) (2013). This creates a limit on how much money a candidate can
receive from a certain group, such as lobbyists and political action committees, effectively creat-
ing a “first-come, first-serve” basis for having contributions accepted by a specific campaign. Id.
On May 19, 2014, Federal District Judge Donovan Frank issued an order enjoining the Minnesota
Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board from enforcing the “large giver” provision of the
statute, which previously limited the amount of contributions that are more than half of the indi-
vidual limit to twenty percent of the candidate’s total amount. Memorandum from the Minn.
Campaign Fin. and Disclosure Bd. on the Campaign Finance Board’s implementation of court-
ordered changes in the application of aggregate special source contribution limits released to the
general public (May 20, 2014), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/bdinfo/Memo-Seaton-
v-Wiener-5-20-14.pdf.
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since the committee reports are readily available to the public via the Cam-
paign Finance and Public Disclosure Board’s website, judges can easily
find out who donated to their campaign and how much they donated.35
The problem is not that there is too much money in judicial cam-
paigns; it is that there is too much of the wrong kind of money. As former
chair of the Federal Election Commission and anti-campaign finance re-
formist Bradley Smith posits, money is not inherently corrupting, and is in
fact necessary to effectuate political speech.36 To advocate for candidates
and issues in a meaningful and effective way, modern campaigns require
advertising, signs, literature, etc. Therefore, the goal of reducing corrupting
influences on judicial officers can best be achieved by increasing the num-
ber of small, independent donors, which will dilute the influence of special
interests and incentivize candidates to seek out small donors instead. The
best system to accomplish this is small donor multiple-matching funds.
II. SMALL-DONOR MULTIPLE-MATCHING FUNDS:
THE NEW YORK CITY MODEL
The small-donor multiple-matching funds system, such as the one used
in New York City, has proven to be a constitutionally sound option to re-
duce corruption or the appearance of corruption, increase reliance on indi-
vidual small donor contributions, and incentivize participation from small
donors and judicial candidates. Before discussing the benefits however, a
detailed explanation of the New York City system and how it would work
for judicial candidates is necessary.
On the heels of massive quid pro quo scandals in New York City,37 a
push for reform swept through City Hall. Among the many ethics reform
laws was the enactment of the Campaign Finance Act.38 At the heart of the
Act is the voluntary Campaign Finance Program, which gives public match-
ing funds to candidates who qualify for and agree to abide by strict spend-
ing limits. The New York City Campaign Finance Board (the Board)
administers the Act.39 Although some provisions of the Act focus on the
35. Candidate Reports of Receipts and Expenditures, MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLO-
SURE BD., http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/rptViewer/viewRptsCan.php#searchType=Candidate
&office=&year=14E&regnum=&letter=&name=&dist=&alpha=0 (last visited July 20, 2014).
36. See generally BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM (Princeton Univ. Press 2001) (arguing why campaign finance laws do not work and are
unconstitutional).
37. Mayor Edward Koch had appointed several corrupt officials to agencies via patronage;
Queens Borough President Donald Manes was caught receiving kickbacks for directing contracts
and patronage jobs. See generally JACK NEWFIELD & WAYNE BARRETT, CITY FOR SALE: ED KOCH
AND THE BETRAYAL OF NEW YORK CITY (Harper Collins 1988).
38. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., LOCAL L. NO. 8 of 1988 § 1, available at http://www
.nyccfb.info/act-program/CFACT.htm.
39. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-708 (2014), available at http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/
LAWSSEAF.cgi?QUERYTYPE=LAWS+&QUERYDATA=$$ADC3-708$$@TXADC03-708+&
LIST=LAW+&BROWSER=BROWSER+&TOKEN=31730242+&TARGET=VIEW.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-2\UST202.txt unknown Seq: 9 21-MAY-15 13:59
2014] INSULATING JUSTICE 235
public finance program, many provisions extend to all candidates, such as
reporting requirements, contribution limits, and disclosure. The purpose of
the Act is to: (1) “[p]rovide easily accessible and comprehensive informa-
tion on candidates’ campaign finances,” (2) “[m]ake candidates and elected
officials more responsive to New York City citizens, rather than special
interests,” (3) “[r]educe the opportunity for campaign contributors to influ-
ence candidates and elected officials,” and (4) “[p]rovide a means for credi-
ble candidates who might not have access to ‘big money’ to run competitive
campaigns via the matching funds program.”40 The following sections will
detail what the Act does, how the Board administers and enforces the Act,
and why state judicial elections would benefit from such a model.
A. Qualifying for public funds
To qualify for public matching funds, the candidate must meet the re-
quirements to appear on the ballot.41 The Act specifies that the public fi-
nancing program extends only to candidates seeking a certain office, in this
case, candidates for mayor, city council, comptroller, public advocate, and
borough president.42 Candidates must then agree to comply with several
limitations.
First, the candidate must agree to provide the Board with any informa-
tion it may request relating to the contributions or expenditures by the can-
didate and the candidate’s committee.43 The candidate must also disclose
the existence of all other committees he or she has certified that have not
been terminated.44 This prevents committees that were created previously
by the candidate, which may not be subject to the public finance program’s
limitations, from circumventing the Act’s spending and contribution limits.
Second, participating candidates must meet a qualifying threshold by
acquiring contributions from a certain number of constituents, scaled to the
size of the constituency.45 A participating candidate for mayor, for example,
needs to raise $250,000 from 1,000 city residents, while a candidate for city
council needs to raise $5,000 from seventy-five in-district residents.46 Can-
didates are not prohibited from accepting legal contributions from corporate
PACs and unions during the qualifying period, “[b]ut only the first $175 of
any contribution from a natural person in the candidate’s district” counts
40. Program Overview, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www
.nyccfb.info/act-program/program-act.aspx?sm=press_ap1.
41. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(a) (2014). This prevents people who want to run for
office that are ineligible (such as a candidate living outside the political district) from receiving
the public funds and then being disqualified for failing to meet the residence requirement. Id.
42. Id. § 3-703(b).
43. Id. § 3-703(d).
44. Id. § 3-703(e)(i).
45. ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN LISS, Small Donor Matching Funds: The NYC Election Ex-
perience 6 (2010), http://brennan.3cdn.net/8116be236784cc923f_iam6benvw.pdf.
46. Id.
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towards the qualifying threshold.47 So even if a mayoral candidate raises
$500,000 through various PACs, self-financing, and out-of-district re-
sidents, none of those contributions would count toward the threshold re-
quirements. The only contributions that count toward the threshold are ones
made by individual small donors living within city limits. After reaching
the threshold amount and having the Board certify the candidate as quali-
fied, the candidate must agree to contribution limits and voluntary expendi-
ture limits.
B. Contribution limits for participating candidates
Participating candidates in New York City elections are subject to con-
tribution limits that are different from state limits. The most important dif-
ference between these contribution limits, however, is not just the amount;
it is how the money is treated.  Contribution limits traditionally focused on
the identity of the contributor, setting one limit for individuals and others
for interest groups. New York City instead focuses its contribution limita-
tions on the office being sought. In 2013, candidates for mayor, public ad-
vocate, and comptroller could receive up to $4,950 from individuals and
political committees,48 while contribution limits for candidates for borough
president and City Council were set at $3,850 and $2,750, respectively.49 In
2009, participating candidates could donate to their own campaigns, but
only up to three times the maximum individual contribution for that specific
office.50
There are some limits still based upon the identity of contributors. Di-
rect contributions by corporations, limited liability companies (LLCs), lim-
ited liability partnerships (LLPs), and partnerships are prohibited.51
Individuals and entities doing business with the city are limited to contribut-
ing $400 for mayor, public advocate, and comptroller, $320 for borough
president, and $250 for city council campaigns.52 In addition to having spe-
cial limits, those doing business with the city are not eligible to have their
funds matched with public money.53 Participating candidates also cannot
receive anonymous contributions, or contributions from unregistered politi-
cal committees.54
47. Id.
48. Campaign Finance Handbook, N.Y.C. Campaign Finance Board (2009), http://www
.nyccfb.info/candidates/candidates/handbooks/2009_Handbook.pdf [hereinafter Handbook].
49. Id. (noting that the contribution limits are for the primary and general election combined,
including any in-kind contributions).
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id.
54. Handbook, supra note 48, at 8.
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C. Multiple-matching of individual contributions
Multiple-matching funds are available only to candidates that have
qualified and agreed to be subject to the special limitations imposed by the
city’s public finance system. Participation is not compulsory, and candi-
dates may choose to run traditional, privately funded campaigns which are
subject to the state limits. The benefits of running a privately funded cam-
paign are that the candidate is not subject to the expenditure limits dis-
cussed below, and he or she may use contributions from many sources that
are restricted by the public finance system, such as unregistered political
committees or self-financing.55
Multiple-matching of individual contributions is a fairly straightfor-
ward process. An individual living within the district who contributes to a
participating candidate will have his or her contribution matched six-to-one
for the first $175.56 For example, if a participating candidate receives a
$100 contribution from an individual person living in his or her district, the
city gives $600 in public funds, making that $100 contribution actually a
$700 contribution. The maximum match amount provided by the city is
$1,050 per person.57 The total amount that a candidate may receive is also
capped, limiting the amount of public funds to fifty-five percent of the total
expenditure limits of each office.58
D. Voluntary expenditure limits and disclosure requirements
As a condition of receiving public funds, participating candidates are
limited in how much they can spend in a given election cycle. Expenditure
limits are based on estimates from the Board, taking into account previous
costs of running a competitive campaign for each city office.59 For exam-
ple, the expenditure limits for participating mayoral candidates in 2013 was
$6,426,000 per election ($12,852,000 for the primary and general elections
combined).60
In addition to limits of spending, participating candidates may only
receive and spend money from donors who disclose their identity.61 This
includes political committees, who must register with the Board and dis-
close all of their donors if they wish to contribute to a publicly funded
campaign.62 A rigorous disclosure provision is essential to reforming judi-
55. Id. at 34.
56. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 45, at 1.
57. Id. at 5. Contributions are aggregated by individual contributor, so that if one person
makes multiple contributions under the $175 limit, public funds are not issued once the combined
amount of an individual’s contributions exceeds $175.
58. Handbook, supra note 48, at 66.
59. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-709, § 3-713 (2014).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 8.
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cial elections to help prevent judges from presiding over cases involving
major contributors, thus creating an improper conflict. As Justice Louis
Brandeis famously wrote, “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfec-
tants[.]”63 Participating candidates are also required to participate in one
public debate and be featured in the city’s voter guide.64
E. The Campaign Finance Board and Fund
The Campaign Finance Act created a special fund, the New York City
Campaign Finance Fund, which is segregated from the general city budget
and pays for the finance system.65 The Fund is financed through appropria-
tions from the Mayor’s Executive Budget, based upon the Board’s estimates
and recommendations.66 The Board, which administers both the Act and the
Fund, has five members, each serving staggered five-year terms.67 The
Mayor and the City Council Speaker appoint two members each, with the
Chair being appointed by the Mayor in consultation with the Speaker.68 The
Board, as mandated by the New York City Charter, must conduct all of its
duties in a nonpartisan fashion.69 Unlike its federal counterpart, the Federal
Election Commission, the Board has clear statutory authority to enforce the
Act, including the power to “audit candidates, issue subpoenas, depose wit-
nesses, bring enforcement actions, promulgate regulations, and render advi-
sory opinions.”70
III. ADAPTING THE MINNESOTA PUBLIC FINANCE SYSTEM FOR
MULTIPLE-MATCH JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Minnesota currently has a partial public finance system for state legis-
lative and gubernatorial candidates, but it does not extend to judicial candi-
dates.71 The system is structured much like the New York City public
finance system, requiring candidates to sign an agreement with the Minne-
sota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board to limit spending and
63. Louis Brandeis, Other People’s Money, Chapter V: What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S
WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.
64. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 45, at 7–8.
65. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-709, § 3-713 (2014).
66. The report to the City Council includes “recommendations as to whether the provisions
of this chapter governing maximum contribution amounts, thresholds for eligibility and expendi-
ture limitations should be amended and setting forth the amount of, and reasons for, any amend-
ments it recommends[.]” Id. at § 3-713(e).
67. Id. § 3-708(1).
68. Id.
69. N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER § 1057 (2014).
70. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 45, at 8 (citing N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-708).
71. SUZANNE NOVAK & PAIGE AMMONS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN MINNESOTA BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE 14 (2007), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/down
load_file_48578.pdf.
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not make independent expenditures.72 The participating candidate then must
raise a certain amount of money from a specified number of voters.73
The Minnesota grants are funded by an income tax check-off and an
annual legislative appropriation to the general fund.74 Minnesota also al-
lows the taxpayer to choose between donating to the general fund and
designating the tax dollars for use by a specific political party whose candi-
date is participating in the public financing system.75 To incentivize voter
participation, a tax rebate is provided to contributors up to $50 per donor.76
A. How the Multiple-Match System Would Work in Judicial Elections
The proposed judicial election system would largely mimic the New
York City Campaign Finance Act. States such as Minnesota with judicial
elections for their supreme court justices would need to begin by reorganiz-
ing their campaign finance regulatory boards to give the boards clear statu-
tory authority for enforcement of the Act, as well as explicitly provide that
judicial campaigns are subject to the current campaign finance laws. Like
the New York City Board, the state board should be able to issue subpoe-
nas, audit candidates, issue regulations and advisory opinions, and bring
enforcement actions against violators of the Act. The governor of the state
and the speaker of the state House of Representatives would make appoint-
ments to the board. A strong, independent board with clear authority has
been integral in New York City’s successful implementation of reform.
The opposite is true of the Federal Election Commission, which is a
bipartisan agency of six commissioners and requires four commissioners to
vote in the affirmative to even initiate an investigation.77 Since the bloc of
Republican commissioners has adopted an anti-regulatory ideology, refus-
ing to investigate apparent campaign finance violations at the recommenda-
tion of their own in-house counsel,78 the New York City and Minnesota
agencies are better equipped to administer and enforce the statutes and
regulations.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The annual appropriation to the general fund is $1.5 million. Id. (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 10A.31 (2006)).
75. Id.
76. PETER S. WATTSON, MINNESOTA’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW pt. III.A, available at http://
www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/treatise/campfin.htm.
77. The FEC is widely criticized for being one of the most ineffective federal agencies in
existence, particularly due to its even-numbered, bipartisan board and murky statutory authority to
enforce its regulations. See Benjamin Weiser & Bill McAllister, The Little Agency that Can’t,
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1997, at A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/
campfin/stories/fec.htm.
78. See generally Ann Ravel, Op-Ed., How Not to Enforce Campaign Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
(Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/how-not-to-enforce-campaign-laws
.html?_r=0 (lamenting the faults of the current system).
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Since judicial elections are generally lower profile and have fewer par-
ticipating candidates, the public finance fund would be relatively smaller in
comparison to the New York City fund. Total spending by judicial candi-
dates generally does not exceed $5 million.79 The multiple-match system
for judicial elections should therefore start at a two- or three-to-one match
on individual contributions up to $250. In order to get judicial candidates to
participate, the cap has to be high enough to assure participating candidates
that the multiple-match program will provide enough funds to run a com-
petitive campaign. The match also has to convince individual donors that
their contribution would amplify their influence enough to compete with
well-financed special interest groups. By setting the bar at this level, the
multiple-match program might be able to attract both candidates and donors
to participate in the public system, as was achieved in New York City.
Expenditure limits will also need to be established to control the costs
of the program. Strict disclosure laws are necessary to prevent not only
fraud and waste, but to reduce corruption and the appearance of corruption.
This may involve some companion provisions to reform judicial ethics rules
on the ability of judges to preside over cases involving large contributors so
as to avoid an appearance of impropriety.80
For Minnesota to implement the multiple-match system in their judi-
cial elections, few changes would have to actually occur. First, the statutory
language would need to be amended to include state judicial candidates as
qualified recipients of public funds. The Campaign Finance and Public Dis-
closure Board already exists and has regulatory authority to conduct audits
and investigations, issue subpoenas, initiate civil proceedings, and issue ad-
visory opinions.81 Second, the judicial ethics rules would not need to
change for the multiple-match program to be effective. Judicial candidates
are not prohibited from soliciting donors through their campaign commit-
tees, television advertisements, emails, or direct-mail pieces. In fact, candi-
dates are only prohibited from personally soliciting donations when
speaking to less than twenty people.82 The candidate’s committee is not
bound by these restrictions and may operate as any other political campaign
committee.83 Additionally, the ability to discover a donor’s identity would
no longer be a problem, particularly if the success of a multiple-match sys-
tem occurs because judicial campaigns would no longer be pursuing large
donors.
79. Sample et al., supra note 1, at Appendix 1.
80. To be clear, I am not proposing absolute recusal of the judge who receives large contribu-
tions from an attorney appearing before the court, rather it could be something as simple as dis-
closing to the attorneys and parties just as any other potential conflict of interest requires.
81. NOVAK & AMMONS, supra note 71, at 18–19.
82. 52 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 4.2(b)(3) (West 2009).
83. Id. at § 4.4.
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B. Benefits of Small-Donor Multiple-Match of Public Funds
Although proponents of the multiple-matching system assert many
benefits, three stand out as the most important for reforming campaign fi-
nance in judicial elections. First, the system survives the constitutional pit-
falls that fell most reform legislation. Second, the system reduces
corrupting influence and the appearance of influence of campaign contribu-
tions. Third, and perhaps most important, the program increases participa-
tion among both small donors and candidates because access to large
donors is no longer a barrier to running for office.
1. It avoids the constitutional pitfalls of most campaign finance
reform legislation
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has systematically nar-
rowed the attempts to reform campaign finance laws. While never wholly
rejecting the notion that legislatures can pass laws to regulate campaign
spending, the Court has struck down many provisions that have crossed
certain thresholds in restricting First Amendment rights.
First, the Court has expressly held that public finance schemes are gen-
erally constitutional because they are voluntary agreements with the gov-
ernment to abide by certain restrictions in exchange for public dollars.84 In
Buckley v. Valeo, campaign expenditures were deemed to be covered by
First Amendment protections, as expenditures were equated with speech;
therefore, limits on expenditures failed to be narrowly tailored enough to
achieve the interest in reducing corruption or the appearance of corrup-
tion.85 These First Amendment protections were extended to judicial cam-
paigns in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.86
Furthermore, public finance systems, such as clean election acts, have
been held to be constitutional.87 These acts are similar to New York City’s
in their qualification requirements, but may vary in how money is distrib-
uted from the Fund to the campaign, usually in a block grant. Problems
occur when one candidate participates, and is therefore subject to the expen-
diture cap, and the other candidate does not participate, allowing that candi-
date to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money. Anticipating this
fundraising disadvantage, some state public finance systems included a trig-
84. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85–109 (1976).
85. See id.
86. A candidate for associate justice for the Minnesota Supreme Court challenged the an-
nouncement clause of the court’s canon of judicial conduct, which prohibited a candidate from
announcing his or her views on legal or political issues. See Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 768–78 (2002).
87. “We have said that governments ‘may engage in public financing of election campaigns’
and that doing so can further ‘significant governmental interest[s],’ such as the state interest in
preventing corruption.” Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806, 2828 (2011) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65, 92–93, 96).
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ger mechanism by which a participating candidate receives an additional
dispersal of funds if the non-participating opponent outraises the participat-
ing candidate by a certain amount. In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Free-
dom PAC v. Bennett,88 the Court reviewed such a program and found that
although the system itself was constitutional, the trigger unlawfully bur-
dened speech because it forces the privately funded candidate to “‘shoulder
a special and potentially significant burden’ when choosing to exercise his
First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of his candidacy.”89 The
Court was specifically concerned that spending from independent groups
against the participating candidate also activated the dispersal of public
funds.90
The judicial campaign law modeled after New York City’s Campaign
Finance Act avoids these initial pitfalls. First, the judicial multiple-match-
ing fund is a public financing system that applies only to candidates that
opt-in and agree to abide by its restrictions. It would not limit expenditures
by non-participating candidates. Second, it does not suffer from the flaws of
other public finance schemes. Instead of providing a block grant, and thus
needing the unconstitutional trigger to allay judges’ concerns of being out-
spent, the multiple-match system works to supplement fundraising efforts.
Although the amount distributed overall is capped, funds are continually
distributed until the cap is reached.
Additionally, the proposed multiple-match system does not trigger
First Amendment problems along Citizens United doctrine. Citizens United
held that the provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)
that limited independent expenditures based upon the corporate identity vio-
lated the First Amendment.91 The Court, however, did not strike down the
limits on how much independent groups may contribute to candidate com-
mittees.92 The only prohibition on independent groups is the amount that
the participating party may receive.  Under Buckley v. Valeo, this require-
ment still passes constitutional muster because the proposed system is a
public financing program.93
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2809 (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008)).
90. See id. at 2819–22.
91. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010).
92. See id. at 365.
93. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court struck down a portion of FECA that imposed expenditure
limits on candidates as violating First Amendment protected speech, but upheld the expenditure
limits under public financing systems because the limits were voluntary. See 424 U.S. at 85–109.
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2. Multiple matching of public funds reduces the reliance on large
contributors and dilutes possible influence or appearance
of influence from special interests
The use of multiple-matching reduces disproportionate influence by
making large contributions a smaller part, and thus less important part, of
the total contributions. The system encourages participating candidates to
pursue small, individual donors because the amount is multiplied six times
its face value, essentially turning a small contribution into a large one. The
system reduces reliance on traditional large donors and special interests by
incentivizing participation of nontraditional donors through amplification.
A large segment of the population believes that elections are bought by
wealthy special interests,94 and the financial advantage these groups have
minimizes any influence that nontraditional donors might exert in a cam-
paign.95 This poses unique problems for the judiciary, in which any influ-
ence outside of the rule of law is suspect. Matching the individual small
donor at a set ratio amplifies the importance of a small donation, which
increases the influence and importance of the small donor. The small donor
multiple-matching system therefore encourages campaigns to engage with,
and rely on, small donors. As former New York City Councilman David
Yassky attests:
[W]ithout the multiple match, a $175 contribution is of mar-
ginal value to a campaign because it is simply too time intensive
to seek out small donors. For example, I could make one phone
call and ask for a $2,000 check, or I could make [twenty] calls to
solicit $100 donations. The six-to-one multiple match turns $100
into $700, making it worth it to pursue small donors.96
A benefit of increasing the participating candidate’s focus on small
donors is that multiple-matching also increases the efficiency of campaign
fundraising by integrating fundraising with voter outreach. Fernando Ferrer,
four-term Bronx Borough President, explained that “the match makes it ef-
fective for me to raise money . . . [because] my fundraising activities do not
diverge as much from my actual campaign as they would without the
match. I am in contact with the same people, regular voters, both for regular
campaign purposes and fundraising purposes.”97 This increase in efficiency
can be especially beneficial to state judicial candidates, many of whom are
94. Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OP. Q. 778, 793–94
(2005).
95. Id.
96. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 45, at 14 (quoting Interview by Angela Migally with David
Yassky, Comm’r/Chair, N.Y. City Taxi and Limousine Comm’n, in New York, N.Y. (June 25,
2010)).
97. Id. at 18 (quoting Affidavit of Fernando Ferrer ¶ 4, City of New York v. N.Y. City
C.F.B., No. 40050/01 (Feb. 12, 2001)).
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lower court judges and must balance their workloads and campaign
schedule.
Data supports the idea that the multiple-match system increases reli-
ance on small donors. In 2009, participating New York City Council candi-
dates had more than twice the number of contributors than nonparticipating
candidates, with the average contribution being less than one-third the size
of nonparticipating candidates.98 Furthermore, individual contributions to
participating candidates of $250 or less comprised thirty-seven percent of
total donations and $1,000 or more comprised thirty-one percent of total
donations.99 The Caperton case demonstrates why it is important to shift
reliance on contributions from large donors to small donors, particularly in
judicial elections. The Court was not concerned with the amount raised or
spent by the campaign, but with how large the contribution and the overall
percentage of that contribution was to the justice’s election.100 By increas-
ing the reliance on small donors, the large donors, and thus the appearance
of influence, is diminished.
3. Multiple-Matching Funds Increase Small Donor and Candidate
Participation
Possibly the most important facet of multiple-matching funds is having
both small donors and candidates willing to participate in the multiple-
matching fund program. Without enough small donors, candidates will not
participate because there would not be enough funds to replace those that
could be solicited from large donors in competitive races. Multiple-match-
ing funds have been successful on both of those fronts.
Before the six-to-one multiple-match program, five times more New
York City residents contributed to candidates in the 2005 city election than
contributed to the 2006 state election.101 The ratio increased to seven times
more contributors in 2009 that contributed to City Council elections than
those who contributed to state campaigns in 2006.102 Although this phe-
nomenon may be influenced by other factors, the number of donors-to-can-
didate pairs contributing $175 or less also grew between 2005 and 2009 by
fifty-five percent.103 There is also no shortage of candidates willing to par-
ticipate in the program. During the 2009 New York City primary election,
98. Id. at 15.
99. The percentages come before the allocated public matching funds are added, which
changes the percentage of individual contributors donating $250 or less to sixty-four percent and
$1,000 or more to sixteen percent. Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Bruscoe & Brendan Glavin, Small
Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and State,
11 ELECTION L.J. 3, 8 tbl.1 (2012).
100. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882–85.
101. Spencer Overton, Matching Political Contributions, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1694, 1714–15
(citing Malbin, supra note 99 at 12 tbl.4).
102. Id.
103. Malbin, Bruscoe & Glavin, supra note 99, at 12.
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ninety-three percent participated while sixty-six percent participated in the
general election.104 This system helps incentivize small donors to partici-
pate because their money is amplified. Candidates will also be willing to
participate because seeking out donations from individuals will be more
valuable.
While some judicial candidates choose to opt out of the public financ-
ing scheme, many judges believe that public financing of judicial elections
has improved judicial elections immensely. Facing the abolition of their
judicial public financing system, fourteen of fifteen sitting North Carolinian
appellate judges signed a letter to the State Senate requesting that the sys-
tem not be altered.105 The judges say that the “current system of nonparti-
san judicial elections supplemented by public financing is an effective and
valuable tool for protecting the public confidence in the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.”106 While the judges admit that the “public
financing program is not a panacea[,] . . . it gives qualified and credible
judicial candidates access to funds necessary to campaign statewide without
having to rely on sources that might be questioned by the public as poten-
tially influencing judicial elections.”107
C. The concerns about multiple-matching funds are overstated
There are several valid concerns that are raised in regards to imple-
menting the multiple-matching fund program, beginning particularly with
the costs. Given the current state of the economy and that even though state
budgets are on the rebound, state legislatures may be reticent to spend mil-
lions of dollars to overhaul their judicial election systems to provide, as
some have called it, “welfare for politicians.”108
104. The decrease in the number of participants between the primary election and general
election is attributed to the decrease in the level of competitiveness in the campaign. According to
the Campaign Finance Board report, after controlling for “paper candidates,” participation rises to
eighty percent. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., NEW YORKERS MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD 139–40
(2010), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2009_PER/2009PostElectionReport.pdf.
105. Editorial, Judges: Public Financing Has Been Tested, Works, THE Charlotte Observer,
June 9, 2013, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2013/06/09/4092249/judges-public-financing-
has-been.html [hereinafter Editorial].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. In addition to the Cato Institute, a conservative-leaning think-tank, publishing a book
titled Welfare for Politicians?, which criticizes public financing, New York Republican State Sen-
ator Jack Martins is leading a fight to dismantle the State’s current system. Jack M. Martins, Join
the Fight Against Welfare for Politicians, N.Y. STATE SENATE, (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www
.nysenate.gov/webform/join-fight-against-welfare-politicians; Art Pope, North Carolina conserva-
tive activist turned state budget director, axed the judicial public financing system accusing it of
being “[c]andidate welfare.” Matea Gold, In N.C., Conservative Donor Art Pope Sits at Heart of
Government He Helped Transform, WASH. POST, July 19, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/in-nc-conservative-donor-art-pope-sits-at-heart-of-government-he-helped-transform/2014/
07/19/eece18ec-0d22-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html.
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In actuality, implementing the multiple-matching funds for judicial
elections would not be costly. The New York City multiple-matching pro-
gram cost $27 million in 2009, which is roughly $3 per resident once every
four years.109 In context, “this represented 0.00011% of New York City’s
budget . . . [and] New York City spends more on . . . printing than it does
on the multiple-match program.”110 Furthermore, the multiple-matching
program is more cost-efficient than conventional full-public financing. In-
stead of providing a flat grant, such as the clean elections programs dis-
cussed earlier, the funds are used to supplement private funds. Public funds
are only distributed when private money is contributed. While some skep-
tics may argue that this could be used to hold over campaign funds for
future races, systems such as New York City’s give the Campaign Finance
Board authority to conduct audits and require campaigns to return unused
funds.
Funding the program may be the biggest hurdle in implementing the
judicial public finance system in Minnesota. The elections are non-partisan,
thus the money allocated from the tax check-off for use by political parties
is not available. The simplest solution is to create another segregated ac-
count and check off for non-partisan judicial candidates, as well as increas-
ing the annual legislative appropriations to ensure an adequate treasury for
participating candidates. Given that the eight candidates running for state
supreme court in 2012 only raised an aggregate of $260,317,111 the increase
in the legislative appropriation would be very minimal. Another option
would be to adopt North Carolina’s judicial public finance scheme, which
not only uses the tax check-off and legislative appropriation, but also draws
funding from a $50 fee levied on active members of the state bar associa-
tion.112 This is a better option because it provides a stable source of funding
while diffusing concerns about wasting taxpayer dollars.
Another concern is that labor unions and corporations could direct
their members and employees to donate en masse to candidates that they
wish to influence, thus skirting the law and using public money to do it.
These organizations already do this in a sense by passing out fliers, en-
dorsements, and making donations from political committees or treasuries.
What the skeptics actually fear is that money would be distributed to the
individuals, who would then contribute the money to the campaign so that it
109. Overton, supra note 101, at 1722 (citing N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., NEW YORKERS
MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD).
110. Id. (citations omitted).
111. Dollar amount does not include independent groups or contributions made to justices not
up for election. See High Court Candidates, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POL., tbl. 1, http://
www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/state_candidates.phtml?s=MN&y=2012&f=J&so
=a#sorttable (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
112. Editorial, supra note 105.
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could be matched. This is already illegal under current conduit laws and
prosecutable as fraud.113
Finally, opponents may cite the recent New York City mayoral elec-
tion, where Michael Bloomberg opted out of the system and financed his
own campaign,114 as an example of the inherent flaw in the system. A pub-
licly financed candidate would not be able to raise the kind of money
needed to defeat a nonparticipating candidate that has access to a massive
war chest of deep-pocketed donors. The presidential public financing sys-
tem faced similar issues, where candidates began opting out because more
money could be raised outside the system.115 The Bloomberg example does
not apply here or to the problem that the multiple-matching system is trying
to address, since money from one’s own pockets could hardly be seen as
being improperly influencing a candidate’s behavior after reaching office.
Funding from one’s own pockets cannot be realistically said to contain a
corrupting influence from special interests. Also, even when nonpartici-
pants are funded by wealthy special interests, the multiple-match system
would allow participating candidates without access to traditional large do-
nors to run a more competitive and effective campaign.
There are substantial differences between the presidential system and
the multiple-match system as well. First, as previously mentioned, the mul-
tiple-match system supplements private money raised and is not a block
grant like the presidential system.116 Once the fund is depleted, the candi-
date may continue to raise money.117 Second, participation has actually in-
creased since the system was established because it increases the incentive
to go after small donors. There is no incentive to do so in the presidential
public finance system. The multiple-matching system will help judicial can-
didates who are well-qualified but do not have access to, or would like to
avoid receiving, contributions from large donors or special interests run
more competitive races.
CONCLUSION
There is no realistic way to get money out of judicial politics, nor is
there an effective method for controlling the increase in campaign spending.
Future reform should have a different focus, especially since the current
113. Overton, supra note 101, at 1724.
114. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 45, at 22.
115. Barack Obama became the first presidential candidate from a major party to opt out of
both the primary and general election public financing schemes. Adam Nagourney & Jeff Zeleny,
Obama Forgoes Public Funds in First for Major Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/us/politics/20obamacnd.html.
116. See Public Funding of Presidential Elections, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec
.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml (last updated Apr. 2014).
117. Spending caps can be lifted if a nonparticipating candidate’s and participating candi-
date’s campaign becomes increasingly competitive. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-
706(1)(a).
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constitutional framework is unlikely to change. Because outside groups will
continue to spend unprecedented amounts of money on judicial elections,
candidates need more money to compete, not less. The special nature of the
judiciary—that judges be fair and impartial—requires judicial campaign fi-
nance reform to insulate Minnesota’s judges from corrupting influences.
The New York City public financing system helps judges reduce their reli-
ance on special interest groups for large contributions to win elections by
incentivizing a broader participation of small donors. This minimizes any
corrupting, or perceivably corrupting influence, such as preferential treat-
ment before the bench that relying on large contributions from special inter-
est groups may cause.
